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- 1 - Economic analysis of law seeks to identify the effects of legal rules on the behavior of 
relevant actors and whether these effects are socially desirable.  The approach employed is that 
of economic analysis generally: the behavior of individuals and firms is described assuming that 
they are forward looking and rational, and the framework of welfare economics is adopted to 
assess the social desirability of outcomes.  The field may be said to have begun with Bentham 
(1789), who systematically examined how actors would behave in the face of legal incentives 
(especially criminal sanctions) and who evaluated outcomes with respect to a clearly stated 
measure of social welfare (utilitarianism).  His work was left essentially undeveloped until four 
important contributions were made: Coase (1960) on externalities and liability, Becker (1968) on 
crime and law enforcement, Calabresi (1970) on accident law, and Posner (1972) on economic 
analysis of law in general.   
Our focus here will be on the analytical foundations of five basic legal subjects: property, 
torts, contracts, civil litigation, and crime and law enforcement (on these, see generally Cooter 
and Ulen, 2003; Posner, 2003; Miceli, 1997; and Shavell, 2004).  We do not treat more particular 
areas of law, such as antitrust, corporate, and tax law, nor do we cite empirical work; for surveys 
of these and other areas of law and economics, including empirical studies, see Polinsky and 
Shavell (2006). 
 
1.  PROPERTY LAW.  Justification and emergence of property rights.  A beginning 
question is why there should be property rights in things.  A number of factors have been 
stressed, especially by early writers.  These include that property rights furnish incentives to 
work and to maintain durable things; that the rights make trade possible; and that if such rights 
were absent, individuals would spend effort trying to take things from each other and protecting 
their things. 
 
- 2 - Property rights would be expected to emerge when their advantages become sufficiently 
great.  For example, Demsetz (1967) explains the development of property rights in land among 
Indians as a way of preventing overly intensive hunting of valuable animals.  Umbeck (1981) 
shows that when gold was discovered in California in 1848, property rights in gold-bearing land 
and river beds developed, as this encouraged individuals to pan for gold and to build sluices; it 
also curbed wasteful efforts to grab land from one another.  For a survey, see Libecap (1986). 
Division of property  rights.  Property rights can be viewed as composed of possessory 
rights — rights of use — and rights to transfer possessory rights.  Thus, what we commonly 
conceive of as ownership (say, of land) entails both a large swath of possessory rights (rights to 
build on land, plant on it, under most contingencies, and into the infinite future) and associated 
rights to transfer them.  Property rights in things are generally held in substantially agglomerated 
bundles, but there is also significant partitioning of rights contemporaneously, over time and 
contingencies, and according to whether the rights are possessory or are for transfer.  For 
example, an owner of land may not hold complete possessory rights, in that others may possess 
an easement giving them the right of passage upon his land, or the right to take timber, or the 
right to extract oil if found (thus a contingent right).  A rental agreement constitutes a division of 
property rights over time.  Trust arrangements, such as those under which an adult manages 
property for a child, divide possessory rights and rights to transfer.    
The division of property rights may be valuable when different parties derive different 
benefits from them, because gains can then be achieved if rights are allocated to those who 
obtain the most from them.  There may, however, be disadvantages to the division of rights, 
including that externalities may arise (a person with a right of passage might trample crops).   
Public property and its acquisition; takings and compensation.  An important class of 
property is that owned by the public.  As is well known, the main justifications for public 
 
- 3 - property concern difficulty that private providers would obtain in charging for certain goods and 
services. 
When it is desirable for the state to acquire property for public use, the state can purchase 
it or take it, through the exercise of the power of eminent domain.  In the latter case, the law 
typically provides that the state must compensate property owners for the value of what has been 
taken from them. 
A difference between purchase and compensated takings is that the amounts owners 
receive is determined by negotiation in the former case but unilaterally by the state in the latter.  
Because of errors in state determination of value, as well as concern about the behavior of 
government officials, purchase would ordinarily be superior to compensated takings.  When, 
however, the state needs to assemble many contiguous parcels, such as for a road, acquisition by 
purchase might be stymied by hold-out problems, making the power to take socially 
advantageous. 
Assuming that there is a reason for the state to take property, a requirement to pay 
compensation may curb problems of overzealousness or abuse of authority by public officials, 
yet it may also exacerbate potential problems of too little public activity, because public 
authorities do not directly receive the benefits of takings (Kaplow, 1986).  Payment of 
compensation also may lead property owners to invest excessively in property; see Blume et al. 
(1984).   
Acquisition of property in unowned things.  The law has to determine under what 
conditions a person will become a legal owner of previously unowned things, such as wild 
animals, fish, and mineral and oil deposits.  Under the finders-keepers rule, incentives to invest 
in capture (such as to hunt for animals or explore for oil) are optimal if only one person is 
making the effort.  However, if many individuals seek unowned things, they will invest a 
 
- 4 - socially excessive amount of resources in search: one person’s investment usually will come, at 
least partly, at the expense of other persons’ likelihood of finding unowned things.  Various 
aspects of the law ameliorate this problem of excessive search effort.  Notable examples are that 
regulations may limit the quantities that can be taken of fish and wild animals, the right to search 
for minerals on the ocean floor may be auctioned, and oil extraction rights may be assigned to 
one party. 
 Acquisition of good title when property is sold.  A basic difficulty associated with sale of 
property that a legal system must solve is establishing validity of ownership or title.  Good title 
is important for trade, since buyers want to be assured that they have property rights in what they 
purchase.  But if any sale gives a buyer good title, theft is encouraged, since thieves could then 
easily sell stolen goods.  Under a registration system, good title means that one’s name is listed 
in the registry as the owner, and title passes at the time of sale by an authorized change in the 
registry.  Hence, buyers can clearly determine whether they are obtaining good title by checking 
the registry, and a thief could not easily sell stolen property by claiming that he has good title.  
Registries, however, are expensive to establish and maintain.   
In the absence of registries, the law may employ the original ownership rule, under 
which  the buyer does not obtain good title if the seller did not have good title.  Alternatively, 
under the bona fide purchase rule, a buyer acquires good title as long as he had reason to think 
that the sale was legitimate, even if the item sold was in fact wrongfully obtained.  This rule 
makes theft more attractive because thieves will often be able to sell their property to buyers who 
will be motivated to “believe” that sales are bona fide. 
Adverse possession.  The legal doctrine of adverse possession allows involuntary transfer 
of land: a person is deemed to become the legal owner of land if he takes possession of it and 
uses it openly for at least a prescribed period, such as ten years.  It may appear that this rule 
 
- 5 - could be desirable because it encourages productive use of idle land.  But this overlooks the 
possibility that there may be good reasons for allowing land to remain idle, plus a prospective 
adverse possessor could always bargain with the owner to rent or buy the land.  Additionally, the 
rule induces owners to expend resources policing incursions and potential adverse possessors to 
attempt possession.  A historical justification for the rule is that, before reliable land registries 
existed, it allowed a seller of land to establish good title to a buyer relatively easily: the seller 
need only show that he was on the land for the prescribed period.    
Constraints on sale of property.  Legal restrictions are often imposed on the sale of goods 
and services.  One standard justification is externalities.  For example, the sale of fireworks 
might be banned because of the externality that their ownership creates, namely, putting others at 
risk of injury.  The other standard justification for legal restrictions on sale is lack of consumer 
information.  For instance, a drug may not be sold without a prescription because of fear that 
otherwise buyers would not use it properly.  Rather than restrict sales, however, the government 
could supply relevant information to consumers, for example, indicating that the drug has 
dangerous side effects, or that it should only be taken with the advice of a medical expert. 
Externalities.  When individuals use property, they may cause externalities, namely, harm 
or benefit to others.  As a general matter, it is socially desirable for individuals to do more than is 
in their self-interest to reduce detrimental externalities and to act so as to increase beneficial 
externalities.  The socially optimal resolution of harmful externalities often involves the behavior 
of victims as well as that of injurers.  If victims can do things to reduce the amount of harm more 
cheaply than injurers (say install air filters to avoid pollution), it is optimal for victims to do so.  
Moreover, victims can sometimes alter their locations to reduce their exposure to harm.    
Legal intervention can ameliorate problems of externalities.  A major form of 
intervention that has been studied is direct regulation, under which the state restricts permissible 
 
- 6 - behavior, such as requiring factories to use smoke arrestors.  Closely related is the injunction, 
whereby a potential victim can enlist the power of the state to force a potential injurer to take 
steps to prevent harm or to cease his activity.  Society can also make use of financial incentives 
to induce injurers to reduce harmful externalities.  Under the corrective tax, a party pays the state 
an amount equal to the expected harm he causes, for example, the expected harm due to a 
discharge of a pollutant into a lake.  There is also liability, a privately-initiated means of 
providing financial incentives, under which injurers pay for harm done if sued by victims.  These 
methods differ in the information that the state needs to apply them, in whether they require or 
harness information that victims have about harm, and in other respects, such that each may be 
superior to the other in different circumstances (Shavell, 1993).    
Parties affected by externalities will sometimes have the opportunity to make mutually 
beneficial agreements with those who generate the externalities, as Coase (1960) stressed.  But 
bargaining may not occur for many reasons: cost; collective action problems (such as when 
many victims each face small harms); and lack of knowledge of harm (such as from an invisible 
carcinogen).  If bargaining does occur, it may not be successful, owing to asymmetric 
information.  These difficulties often make bargaining a problematic solution to externality 
problems and imply that liability rules are needed, as discussed by Calabresi and Melamed 
(1972).     
Property rights in information.  The granting of property rights in information, notably 
the award of patents for inventions and copyrights for written works and certain other 
compositions, involves a major social benefit — provision of incentives to create intellectual 
works – but also a social disadvantage — creation of power to price above marginal cost.  Patent 
and copyright law have been examined to ascertain how they reflect the tradeoff between this 
benefit and disadvantage.  A distinct form of legal protection is trade secret law, comprising 
 
- 7 - various doctrines of contract and tort law that serve to protect a range of commercially valuable 
information that is not (or cannot be) protected by patent or copyright, such as customer lists.  
On property rights in information, see generally Landes and Posner (2003).     
An alternative to property rights in information is for the state to offer rewards to 
creators of information and for information that is developed to be made available to all who 
want it.  Thus, an author of a book would receive a reward from the state for the writing of the 
book, possibly based on sales of the book, but anyone who wanted to print it and sell it could do 
so.  This system would create incentives for the creation of information without distorting prices, 
but requires the state to choose the magnitude of rewards. 
Property rights in labels.  Many goods and services are identified by labels, which have 
substantial social value because the quality of goods and services may be hard for consumers to 
determine directly.  Labels enable consumers to purchase goods and services on the basis of 
product quality without  requiring consumers to independently determine quality; a person who 
wants to stay at a high-quality hotel in another city can choose such a hotel merely by its label, 
such as “Ritz Hotel.”  In addition, sellers who label their output will have an incentive to 
produce goods and services of quality because consumers will recognize quality through sellers= 
labels.  This basic reasoning is used to justify property rights in trademarks, as discussed by 
Landes and Posner (1987b). 
 
2.  LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENTS.  Legal liability for accidents, which is governed by 
tort law, is a means by which society can reduce the risk of harm by threatening potential 
injurers with having to pay for the harms they cause.  Liability is also frequently viewed as a 
device for compensating victims of harm, but we will emphasize that insurance can provide 
compensation more cheaply than the liability system.  There are two basic rules of liability.  
 
- 8 - Under strict liability, an injurer must always pay for harm due to an accident that he causes.  
Under the negligence rule, an injurer must pay for harm caused only when he is found negligent, 
that is, only when his level of care was less than a standard of care chosen by the courts, often 
referred to as due care.  (There are various versions of these rules that depend on whether 
victims’ care was insufficient.)  In practice, the negligence rule is the dominant form of liability; 
strict liability is reserved mainly for certain especially dangerous activities.  On economic 
analysis of liability for accidents, see generally Calabresi (1970), Landes and Posner (1987a), 
and Shavell (1987a). 
Incentives to take care.  In order to focus on how liability affects the incentive to prevent 
harm, assume first that parties are risk neutral and that accidents are unilateral — only injurers 
(not victims) influence risk — by their choice of care x.  Let p(x) be the probability of an 
accident that causes harm h, where p is declining in x.  Assume that the social objective is to 
minimize total expected costs, x + p(x)h, and let x* denote the optimal x. 
Under strict liability, injurers pay damages equal to h whenever an accident occurs, and 
they naturally bear the cost of care x.  Thus, they minimize x + p(x)h; accordingly, they choose 
x*. 
Under the negligence rule, suppose that the due care level is set equal to x*, meaning that 
an injurer who causes harm will have to pay h if x < x*, but will not have to pay anything if x $ 
x*.   Then it can be shown that the injurer will choose x*: clearly, the injurer will not choose x 
greater than x*; and he will not choose x < x*, for then he will be liable (in which case the 
analysis of strict liability shows that he would not choose x < x*).  Thus, under both forms of 
liability, injurers are led to take optimal care.  Note that to apply the negligence rule, courts need 
sufficient information to calculate x* and to observe x, whereas under strict liability they only 
have to observe x.   
 
- 9 - The analysis of incentives and liability has been undertaken as well for bilateral 
accidents, in which victims also take care, and when there is uncertainty in the determination of 
negligence (such as due to imperfect observation of x).  On incentives and liability for unilateral 
and bilateral accidents, see originally Brown (1973) (and see also Diamond, 1974).   
Level of activity.  An important extension allows for injurers to choose their level of 
activity z, which is interpreted as the (continuously variable) number of times they engage in 
their activity (or if injurers are firms, their output).  Let b(z) be the benefit (or profit) from the 
activity, and assume the social objective is to maximize b(z) – z(x + p(x)h); here x + p(x)h is 
assumed to be the cost of care and expected harm each time an injurer engages in his activity.  
Let x* and z* be optimal values.  Note that x* minimizes x + p(x)h, so x* is as described above, 
and that z* is determined by bN(z) = x* + p(x*)h, which is to say, the marginal benefit from the 
activity equals the marginal social cost.   
Under strict liability, an injurer will choose both the level of care and the level of activity 
optimally, as his objective will be the same as the social objective, to maximize b(z) – z(x + 
p(x)h), because damage payments equal h whenever harm occurs.  Under the negligence rule, an 
injurer will choose optimal care x* as before, but his level of activity z will be socially excessive. 
 In particular, because an injurer will escape liability by taking care x*, he will choose z to 
maximize b(z) – zx*, so that z will satisfy bN(z) = x*.  The injurer=s cost of raising his level of 
activity is only his cost of care x*, which is less than the social cost, which also includes p(x*)h.  
On liability and the level of activity, see Shavell (1980b). 
The failure of the negligence rule to control the level of activity arises because 
negligence is defined here (and also generally in practice) in terms of care alone.  A justification 
for this restriction is the difficulty courts would face in determining the optimal activity level z* 
and the actual z.  The failure of the negligence rule to control the injurer’s level of activity is 
 
- 10 - applicable to any aspect of injurer behavior that would be difficult to regulate directly (including, 
for example, research and development activity).  If, however, courts were able to incorporate all 
aspects of injurer behavior into the definition of due care, the negligence rule would result in 
optimal behavior in all respects.  (Note that the variable x in the original problem could be 
interpreted as a vector, with each element corresponding to a dimension of behavior.) 
Product liability.  Another extension of the model of liability and incentives concerns 
product liability, the liability of firms for harms suffered by their customers.  Here the degree to 
which liability creates incentives to reduce risk depends on customer knowledge of risk.  If their 
knowledge is perfect, liability does not affect incentives since customers will recognize risky 
products and pay appropriately less for them.  If their knowledge is imperfect, there is a role for 
liability, in many respects similar to what has been discussed above. 
Risk-bearing and insurance.  In addition to affecting incentives to reduce harm, the 
socially optimal resolution of the accident problem involves the spreading of risk to lessen risk-
bearing by risk-averse parties.  Risk-bearing is relevant not only because potential victims may 
face the risk of accident losses, but also because potential injurers may face the risk of liability.  
The former risk can be mitigated through so-called first-party insurance that covers losses 
suffered in accidents, and the latter through liability insurance. 
Because risk-averse individuals tend to purchase insurance, the incentives associated 
with liability do not function in the direct way discussed above, but instead are mediated by the 
terms of insurance policies.  To illustrate, consider strict liability in the unilateral accident model 
with care alone allowed to vary, and assume that insurance is sold at actuarially fair rates.  If 
injurers are risk averse and liability insurers can observe their levels of care, injurers will 
purchase full liability insurance coverage and their premiums will depend on their level of care; 
their premiums will equal p(x)h.  Thus, injurers will want to minimize their costs of care plus 
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liability insurance eliminates risk for injurers, and the situation reduces to the previously 
analyzed risk-neutral case.  (Victims do not bear risk either because, in the present case, they are 
fully compensated for their losses.) 
If, however, liability insurers cannot observe levels of care, insurance policies with full 
coverage would create severe moral hazard, and so would not be purchased.  Instead, as we 
know from the theory of insurance, the typical amount of coverage purchased will be partial, for 
that leaves injurers with an incentive to reduce risk.  In this case, therefore, the liability rule 
results in some direct incentive to take care because injurers are left bearing some risk after their 
purchase of liability insurance.  But levels of care will still tend to be less than first-best. 
This last observation raises the question of whether the sale of liability insurance is 
socially desirable.  (We note that because of concern about diluted incentives, liability insurance 
was delayed for decades in many countries and is sometimes forbidden today, such as against 
punitive damages.)  Notwithstanding the moral hazard problem, the sale of liability insurance is 
socially desirable, at least in basic models of accidents and some variations of them.  This is 
because, if the liability insurer and the injurer together have to pay for the harm caused, the 
insurance policy will appropriately balance the social desire to reduce harm and the social desire 
to reduce risk-bearing. 
Parallel observations apply under the negligence rule, where the focus of concern is on 
the bearing of risk by victims since injurers generally will take due care and not be liable.  Risk-
averse potential victims will tend to purchase first-party accident insurance. 
The presence of insurance implies that the liability system cannot be justified primarily 
as a means of compensating risk-averse victims against loss.  Rather, the justification for the 
liability system must lie in significant part in the incentives that it creates to reduce risk.  To 
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liability system is much more expensive than the insurance system (see below).  Accordingly, if 
there were not a social need to create incentives to reduce risk, it would be best to dispense with 
the liability system and to rely on insurance to accomplish compensation.  On liability and 
insurance, see Shavell (1982a). 
Administrative costs.  The administrative costs of the liability system — the legal costs 
and effort of litigants involved in suit, settlement, and trial — are substantial, generally 
exceeding the amounts received by victims.  Consideration of administrative costs affects the 
comparison of liability rules, but it is not clear which rule involves greater expense: more cases 
are brought under strict liability than under the negligence rule (victims will not sue under the 
negligence rule if they believe the injurer was not negligent), but the cost of resolving a case 
should be greater under the negligence rule (because due care and the injurer’s care level need to 
be ascertained).  The existence of administrative costs raises the question of whether the 
incentive benefits of the liability system justify incurring these costs, as  well as whether the 
private incentive to sue is socially optimal.  These questions will be discussed in section 4. 
 
3.  CONTRACTS.  A contract is a specification of the actions that named parties are 
supposed to take at various times, as a function of the conditions that then obtain.  A contract is 
said to be completely-detailed, or simply complete, if the contract provides explicitly for all 
possible conditions.  An incomplete contract may well cover all conditions by implication.  A 
contract stating merely that a specified price will be paid for a bushel of wheat is incomplete 
because it does not mention many contingencies that might affect the parties.  Note that such an 
incomplete contract has no gaps, as it stipulates what the parties are to do in all circumstances.  
Typically, incomplete contracts do not include conditions which, were they easy to include, 
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Contracts are here assumed to be enforced by a tribunal, which will usually be interpreted 
to be a state-authorized court, but it could also be another entity, such as an arbitrator or the 
decisionmaking body of a trade association or a religious group.  (Reputation and other non-legal 
factors may also serve to enforce contracts, but these will not be discussed.)  Enforcement refers 
to actions taken by the tribunal when one or more of the parties to the contract decide to come 
before it.   
General reasons for contracts.  At a broad level, parties make contracts when they have a 
need to make plans.  They also want contracts enforced to prevent opportunistic behavior that 
otherwise might occur during the course of the contractual relationship and stymie fulfillment of 
their plans.  There are two basic contexts in which parties make enforceable contracts. 
The first concerns virtually any kind of financial arrangement.  The necessity of contract 
enforcement here is transparent.  In financial arrangements, there is often a party who extends 
credit to another for some time period, and contract enforcement prevents his credit from being 
appropriated, which otherwise would render the arrangements impossible.  For example, if 
borrowers are not forced to repay loans, loans would be unworkable.  In addition, financial 
contracts that allocate risk would generally be useless without enforcement because, once the 
risky outcome became known, one of the parties would not wish to honor the contract. 
The second context in which parties make enforceable contracts involves the supply of 
customized or specialized goods and services, which cannot be purchased on a spot market in a 
simultaneous exchange for money.  The need for enforcement of agreements for supply of 
customized goods and services inheres in several advantages: averting problems of holdup, 
which might distort incentives to invest in the contractual enterprise; allocation of risk; and 
prevention of inappropriate breach or performance, which can result from imperfect bargaining 
 
- 14 - due to sheer cost or asymmetric information. 
Contract formation.  The formation of contracts is of interest in several respects.  One 
issue concerns search effort (Diamond and Maskin, 1979).  Parties expend effort in finding 
contractual partners, and it is apparent that their search effort will not generally be socially 
optimal.  On one hand, they might not search enough: because the joint gain from contracting 
will generally be divided between the parties through the bargaining process, the private return 
to search may be less than the social return.  On the other hand, parties might search more than is 
socially desirable because of a negative externality associated with discovery of a contract 
partner: when one party finds and contracts with a second, other parties are thereby prevented 
from contracting with that party. 
 A basic question that a tribunal must answer is at what stage of interactions between 
parties does a contract become legally recognized?  The general legal rule is that contracts are 
recognized if and only if both parties give a clear indication of assent, such as signing their 
names on a document.  This rule allows parties to make enforceable contracts when they so 
desire, and it also protects parties from becoming legally obligated against their wishes, such as 
from one party’s reliance on the other’s statements (Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar, 2001; Wils, 
1993).    Mutual assent sometimes is not simultaneous; one party will make an offer and time 
will pass before the other agrees.  An issue that this raises is how long, and under what 
circumstances, the offeror will want to be held to his offer, and whether he should be held to it.  
If an offeror is held to his terms, offerees will often be led to invest effort in investigating 
contractual opportunities.  Otherwise, offerees might be taken advantage of by offerors if the 
offerees expressed serious interest after costly investigation (the offeror could change to less 
favorable terms).  The anticipation of such offeror advantage-taking would reduce offerees’ 
incentive to engage in investigation and thus diminish mutually beneficial contract formation.  
 
- 15 - (See, for example, Craswell, 1996; Katz, 1990, 1996.)  
Another issue of note is disclosure of information at the time of contract formation.  
Disclosure may be socially beneficial because the disclosed information may be desirably 
employed by one of the parties; suppose, for instance, that a buyer of a house learns from the 
seller that the basement leaks and thus decides not to store valuables there.  However, a 
disclosure obligation discourages parties from investing in acquisition of information (Kronman, 
1978).  For example, an oil company contemplating buying land might decide against conducting 
a geological analysis of it to determine its oil-bearing potential if the company would be required 
to disclose its findings to the seller of the land, as the seller would then demand a price reflecting 
the value of the land.  The social welfare consequences of the effect of a disclosure obligation on 
the motive to acquire information depend on whether the information is socially valuable or 
mere foreknowledge, on whether the party acquiring information is the buyer or the seller, and 
on inferences that would be made from silence (Shavell, 1994). 
Even if both parties have given their assent, a contract will not be recognized if it was 
made when one of the parties was put under undue pressure, for example, if he was physically or 
otherwise threatened by another.  This legal rule has virtues similar to those of laws against theft; 
it reduces individuals= incentives to expend effort making threats and to defend against them. 
In addition, contracts may not be legally recognized if they are made in emergency 
situations, such as when the owner of a ship in distress promises to pay an exorbitant amount for 
rescue.  Nonenforcement in such situations beneficially provides potential victims with implicit 
insurance against having to pay high prices, but it also reduces incentives for rescue. 
Incomplete nature of contracts and their less-than-rigorous enforcement.  Contracts are 
commonly observed to be significantly incomplete, leaving out all manner of variables and 
contingencies that are of potential relevance to contracting parties.  Moreover, contracts are not 
 
- 16 - enforced with high sanctions, and breach is not an uncommon event.   
There are three reasons for the incompleteness of contracts.  The first is the cost of 
writing more complete contracts.  The second is that some variables (effort levels, technical 
production difficulties) cannot be verified by tribunals.  The third is that the expected 
consequences of incompleteness may not be very harmful to contracting parties.  Incompleteness 
may not be harmful because a tribunal might interpret an imperfect contract in a desirable 
manner.  Also, as will be seen, the prospect of having to pay damages for breach of contract may 
serve as an implicit substitute for more detailed terms.  Furthermore, the opportunity to 
renegotiate a contract often furnishes a way for parties to alter terms in the light of circumstances 
for which contractual provisions had not been made.   
Interpretation of contracts.  Contractual interpretation, which includes a tribunal’s filling 
gaps, resolving ambiguities, and overriding literal language, can benefit parties by easing their 
drafting burdens or reducing their need to understand contractual detail.  For example, if it is 
efficient to excuse a seller from having to perform if his factory burns down, the parties need not 
incur the cost of specifying this exception in their contract, assuming that they can trust the 
tribunal to interpret their contract as if the exception were specified.  A method of interpretation 
can be viewed formally as a function that transforms the contract individuals write into the 
effective contract that the tribunal will enforce.  Given a method of interpretation, parties will 
choose contracts in a constrained-efficient way.  Notably, if the parties are concerned that an 
aspect of their contract would not be interpreted as they want, they could either bear the cost of 
writing a more explicit term that would be respected by the tribunal, or they could simply accept 
the expected loss from having a less-than-efficient term.  The socially optimal method of 
interpretation will take this reaction of contracting parties into account and can be regarded as 
minimizing the sum of the costs the parties bear in writing contracts and the losses resulting from 
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Shavell, 2006.) 
Damage measures for breach of contract.  When parties breach a contract, they often 
have to pay damages in consequence.  The damage measure, the formula governing what they 
should pay, can be determined by the tribunal or it can be stipulated in advance by the parties to 
the contract.  One would expect parties to specify their own damage measure when it would 
better serve their purposes than the measure the tribunal would employ, and otherwise to allow 
the tribunal to select the damage measure.  In either case, we now examine the utility of different 
damage measures to contracting parties, assuming initially that there is no renegotiation of 
contracts. 
Clearly, the prospect of having to pay damages provides an incentive to perform 
contractual obligations, and thus generally promotes enforcement of contracts and the goals of 
the parties.  Under the commonly employed expectation measure, damages equal the amount that 
compensates the victim of breach for his losses.  Under this measure, a seller contemplating 
breach will be induced to perform if the cost of performance to the seller is less than the value of 
performance to the buyer, and to breach otherwise.  Because the expectation measure leads to 
maximization of joint value, it would be chosen by the parties (setting aside investment 
incentives and risk-bearing), as emphasized in Shavell (1980a).  Another commonly employed 
measure of damages is the reliance measure, damages equal to the amount spent by the victim 
relying on contract performance, such as expenditures on advertising an entertainer who has 
contracted to appear at one’s nightclub. 
The point that the expectation measure of damages induces efficient performance of 
parties sheds light on the view of many legal commentators that breach is immoral.  This view 
fails to account for the fact that contracts that are breached are generally incomplete, and that 
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contract.    
Damage measures not only affect performance, they also influence the ex ante motive to 
make investments in reliance on contract performance.  Under the expectation measure, reliance 
investments tend to exceed efficient levels: the buyer will treat an investment (like advertising an 
entertainer) as one with a sure payoff, since he either will receive performance or expectation 
damages, whereas the actual return to the investment is uncertain, due to the possibility of breach 
(advertising will be a waste if the entertainer does not appear); see Shavell (1980a).  This 
tendency toward overreliance stands in contrast to the problem of inadequate reliance investment 
associated with lack of contract enforcement. 
Damage measures affect risk-bearing as well as incentives.  Notably, because the 
expectation measure compensates the victim of a breach, the measure might be mutually 
desirable as a form of insurance if the victim is risk averse (Polinsky, 1983).  However, the 
prospect of having to pay damages also constitutes a risk for a party who might commit breach 
(such as a seller whose costs suddenly rise), and he might be risk averse as well.  The latter 
consideration may lead parties to want to lower damages or to employ damages less frequently 
by writing more detailed contracts (for instance, the parties could go to the expense of specifying 
in the contract that a seller can be excused from performance if his costs are unusually high). 
Specific performance as a remedy for breach.  An alternative to use of a damage measure 
for breach of contract is specific performance: requiring a party to satisfy his contractual 
obligation.  Specific performance can be accomplished with a sufficiently high threat or by 
exercise of the state=s police powers, such as by a sheriff removing a person from the land that he 
promised to convey.  (Note that if a monetary penalty can be employed to induce performance, 
then specific performance is equivalent to a damage measure with a high level of damages.) 
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that parties should not want specific performance of many contracts that they write, for they do 
not wish their incomplete contracts always to be performed.  It is therefore not surprising that, in 
fact, specific performance is not used as the remedy for breach for most contracts for production 
of goods and for provision of services.  Additionally, specific performance might be peculiarly 
difficult to enforce in these contexts because of problems in monitoring and controlling parties= 
effort levels and the quality of production.   
However, specific performance does have advantages for parties in certain contexts, such 
as in contracts for the transfer of things that already exist, like land, and specific performance is 
the usual legal remedy for sellers= breaches of contracts for the sale of land. 
Renegotiation of contracts.  Parties often have the opportunity to renegotiate their 
contracts when problems arise.  Indeed, the assumption that they will do this has appeal because, 
having made an initial contract, the parties know of each other=s existence and of many 
particulars of the contractual situation.  For this reason, much of the economics literature (as 
opposed to law and economics literature) on contracts assumes that renegotiation always occurs 
and that, due to symmetric information between the parties, it always results in efficient 
performance.  Hence, damage measures for breach of contract, or more generally, the 
mechanisms that the parties stipulate in their contracts, establish the threat points for 
renegotiation.  If properly designed, the mechanisms can foster beneficial incentives to invest ex 
ante, on the part of both parties.  On this extensive literature, see, for example, Rogerson (1984), 
Hart (1987), Hart and Moore (1988), and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).   
Legal overriding of contracts.  A basic rationale for legislative or judicial overriding of 
contracts is the existence of externalities.  Contracts that are likely to harm third parties are often 
not enforced, including, for example, agreements to commit crimes, price-fixing compacts, 
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Another general rationale for nonenforcement of contracts is to prevent a loss in welfare 
to one or both of the parties to a contract.  This concern may justify nonenforcement when a 
party is incompetent, lacks relevant information, or is in an emergency situation.  The rationale 
also applies in the context of contract interpretation by tribunals.  As noted, contract 
interpretation may amount to the overriding of a written contractual term, and this practice may 
promote the welfare of contracting parties by allowing them to save writing costs, given that 
courts will step in and correct inefficient terms.  
Additionally, contracts sometimes are not enforced because they involve the sale of 
things said to be inalienable, such as human organs, babies, and voting rights.  In many of these 
cases, the inalienability justification for lack of enforcement can be recognized as involving 
externalities or the welfare of the contracting parties.   
 
4.  LITIGATION.  We here consider the bringing and adjudication of lawsuits: the choice 
of a party who has suffered a loss whether to sue; if suit is brought, the choice of the litigants 
whether to settle with each other or instead go to trial; and the choice of litigants, before or 
during trial, of how much to spend on litigation. 
Suit.  As a general matter, a party who has suffered loss, the plaintiff, will sue when the 
cost of suit cP is less than the expected benefits from suit.  The expected benefits from suit 
incorporate potential settlements or trial outcomes, but assume for simplicity that if suit is 
brought, the plaintiff obtains for sure a judgment equal to harm suffered, h.  Thus the plaintiff 
will sue when his litigation cost, cP, is less than h.  (Obviously, if there is only a probability p of 
winning this amount, a risk-neutral plaintiff would sue when cP < ph; and a risk-averse plaintiff 
would be less likely to sue.)   
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incentive to sue, as emphasized in Shavell (1982b, 1997).  The deviation could be in either 
direction.  On one hand, there is a divergence between private and social costs that can lead to 
socially excessive suit: when a plaintiff contemplates bringing suit, he bears only his own costs; 
he does not take into account the defendant=s costs or the state=s costs that his suit will engender. 
 On the other hand, there is a difference between the private and social benefits of suit that can 
either lead to a socially inadequate level of suit or reinforce the cost-related tendency toward 
excessive suit.  Specifically, the plaintiff considers his private benefit from suit, the gain he 
would obtain from prevailing, but not the social benefit, the deterrent effect on the behavior of 
injurers generally.  The private gain could be larger or smaller than the social benefit.    
To illustrate, suppose that liability is strict.  As stated, victims will sue if and only if cP < 
h.  Let x be the precaution expenditures that injurers will be induced to make if there is suit, q the 
probability of harm if suit is not brought, and qN   the probability of harm if suit is brought.   
(Thus, qN   will be less than q if x is spent on precautions.)  Suit will be socially worthwhile if and 
only if qN (cP + cD + cS) <  (q ! qN  ) h ! x, where cD  is the defendant=s litigation cost and cS  is the 
state=s cost.  In other words, suit is socially worthwhile if the expected litigation costs are less 
than the deterrence benefits of suit net of the cost of precautions.  The condition for victims to 
sue and the condition for suit to be socially optimal are very different.  Whether victims will sue 
does not depend on the costs cD and cS.  Moreover, the private benefit of suit is what the victim 
will receive as a damages award, h; in contrast, the social benefit is the harm weighted by the 
reduction in the accident probability, q ! qN ,  net of the cost of precautions, x.  It is evident, 
therefore, that victims might sue when suit is not socially desirable, or that victims might not sue 
even when suit would be socially beneficial. 
The main implication of the private and social divergence is that state intervention may 
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some domain, or a problem of inadequate suit, by subsidizing suit in some way.  For the state to 
determine optimal policy, however, requires it to estimate the effects of suit on injurer behavior 
and weigh them against the social costs of suit.   
The importance of the private-social divergence in incentives to sue may be substantial.  
This is suggested by the high costs of using the legal system; indeed, legal costs may on average 
actually equal the amounts received by those who sue.  Hence, the incentives created by the legal 
system must be significant to justify its use.  Regardless of whether the legal system creates 
valuable incentives, however, the private motive to bring suit may be great, giving rise to a 
reason for social intervention.  Conversely, in some domains the incentive to sue may be low 
(say damages per plaintiff are not great) even though the value of deterrence is significant.  This 
might justify the state=s encouraging litigation.    
Settlement versus trial.  Assuming that a suit has been brought, we now consider whether 
parties will  reach a settlement or go to trial.  A settlement is a legally enforceable contract, 
usually involving a payment from the defendant to the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff agrees not 
to pursue his claim further.  If the parties do not reach a settlement, we assume that they go to 
trial, that is, that some tribunal determines the outcome of their case.  In fact, the vast majority of 
cases settle.   
One model of the settlement-versus-trial decision presumes that the parties have 
somehow each come to a belief about the probability of the trial outcome (Posner 2003, ch. 21; 
Shavell, 2004, ch. 17); let pP represent the plaintiff’s opinion about his probability of the plaintiff 
prevailing, and let pD be the defendant’s opinion about that same probability.  Let w be the 
amount that would be won (for simplicity assume that they agree about w).  Assume also that the 
parties are risk neutral.  The plaintiff=s expected gain from trial, net of his litigation costs, is pPw 
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a settlement is possible if and only if pPw – cP # pDw + cD, in which case the settlement amount 
will be in the settlement range [pPw – cP, pDw + cD].  Note that if the parties agree on the 
plaintiff’s probability of prevailing, a settlement is feasible.  A settlement range does not exist, 
and therefore trial will occur, if pPw –  pDw > cP + cD.  Risk aversion of the parties increases the 
size of the settlement range and thus, one presumes, makes settlement more likely: if the plaintiff 
is risk averse, he will be willing to settle for less than pPw – cP; and if the defendant is risk 
averse, he will be willing to pay more than  pDw + cD. 
The model just discussed does not explain the origin of the parties’ beliefs and does not 
include a description of rational bargaining between them.  Subsequently, standard asymmetric 
information models of settlement versus litigation were examined (Bebchuk, 1984; Reinganum 
and Wilde, 1986; Schweizer, 1989; Spier, 1992; Hay and Spier, 1998; and Daughety, 2000).  In a 
simple model of this type, there is one-sided asymmetry of information and the party without 
private information makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement proposal.  For example, the plaintiff 
makes a demand x to the defendant, who has private information about the probability p that he 
will lose at trial.  If pw + cD < x, the defendant will reject the demand and the plaintiff will 
therefore obtain only pw – cP, but if pw + cD $ x, the defendant will accept and pay x.  The 
plaintiff chooses x to maximize his expected payoff from settlement or trial.  The higher his 
demand x, the more he will obtain if it is accepted, but the greater the likelihood of rejection and 
thus of his bearing trial costs.  At the optimal demand for the plaintiff, there will generally be a 
positive probability of trial and also of settlement.   
The virtues of such asymmetric information models are twofold.  First, they include an 
explicit account of bargaining and thus of the probability of settlement and the magnitude of the 
settlement offer or demand.  (The outcomes of these models depend, however, on essentially 
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uninformed party.)  Second, the models explain differences of opinion that give rise to trial in 
terms of differences in possession of information.  (However, the models do not account for why 
there should be differences in information, given that the parties have incentives to share 
information and may be forced to do so through legal discovery.) 
The private and social incentive to settle generally diverge for several reasons.  First, 
because the litigants do not bear all of the costs of a trial (such as the salaries of judges and the 
forgone value of juror time), they save less by settling than society does, which tends to make 
the private incentive to settle socially inadequate.  Second, when there is asymmetric 
information, parties will fail to settle when the plaintiff’s demand turns out to have been too high 
or the defendant’s offer too low.  But their desire to obtain from each other a greater share of the 
benefit from settling does not itself translate into any social benefit.  Third, the prospect of 
settlement may reduce deterrence because defendants gain from settlement.   
Litigation expenditures.  A plaintiff will continue spending on litigation as long as this 
raises his expected return from settlement or trial (net of litigation costs), and a defendant will 
make such expenditures as long as this lowers his expected total outlays.  The effects of each 
litigant=s expenditures will generally depend on what the other does, and the two will often be 
spending to rebut one another. 
There are several reasons why the private and social incentives to spend on litigation 
diverge.  First, to the extent that their expenditures simply offset each other, without altering trial 
or settlement outcomes, the expenditures constitute a social waste.  Second, the litigants’ trial 
expenditures may mislead the tribunal rather than enhance the accuracy of the outcome, which 
has negative social value.  Third, even if trial expenditures do improve the accuracy of outcomes, 
they may not be socially optimal in magnitude, for the parties only consider how their 
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deterrence.   
Because private and social incentives to spend on litigation may diverge, it may be 
beneficial for expenditures to be either curtailed or encouraged.  In practice, courts often restrict 
the legal effort that parties can undertake, for example, by limiting the extent of discovery and 
the number of testifying experts. 
  Other topics.  A number of other topics that relate to litigation and the legal process 
have been studied, including the selection of suits for litigation (Priest and Klein, 1984); the 
accuracy of adjudication (Kaplow, 1994, Png, 1986); “discovery,” that is, mandated disclosure 
of information during litigation (Shavell, 1989); and the appeals process (Daughety and 
Reinganum, 2000; Shavell, 1995; and Spitzer and Talley, 2000). 
 
5.  PUBLIC LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL LAW.  Law enforcement often 
is the result of the efforts of public agents, such as inspectors, tax auditors, and police.  We here 
discuss certain characteristics of optimal public law enforcement.  As noted, this subject was first 
analyzed by Bentham (1789) and Becker (1968) (for a survey, see Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). 
Rationale for public enforcement.  A basic question is why there is a need for public 
enforcement of law in the light of the availability of private suits brought by victims (Becker and 
Stigler, 1974; Landes and Posner, 1975; Polinsky, 1980).  The answer depends importantly on 
the locus of information about the identity of injurers.  When victims of harm naturally possess 
knowledge of the identity of injurers, allowing private suits for damages will motivate victims to 
sue and thus harness the information they have for purposes of law enforcement.  This may help 
to explain why the enforcement of contractual obligations and of accident law is primarily 
private.  When victims do not know who caused harm, however, or when finding injurers is 
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of crimes and of many violations of environmental and safety regulations. 
Basic framework for analyzing public enforcement.  Suppose that if an individual 
commits a harmful act, he obtains a gain and also faces the risk of being caught and sanctioned.  
The sanction could be a fine or a prison term.  Fines will be treated as socially costless because 
they are mere transfers of money, whereas imprisonment is socially costly because of the 
expense of operating prisons and the disutility suffered by those imprisoned (which is not offset 
by gains to others).  The higher is the probability of detecting and sanctioning violators, the more 
resources the state must devote to enforcement.  
We assume that social welfare equals the sum of individuals= expected utilities.  If 
individuals are risk neutral, social welfare can be expressed as the gains individuals obtain from 
committing their harmful acts, less the harms caused, and less the costs of law enforcement.  The 
enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize social welfare by choosing enforcement 
expenditures, or, equivalently, a probability of detection, the form of sanctions, and their level. 
Fines.  Suppose that the sanction is a fine and that individuals are risk neutral.  Then the 
optimal level of the fine is maximal, fM, as emphasized in Becker (1968).  If the fine were not 
maximal, society could save enforcement costs by simultaneously raising the fine and lowering 
the probability without affecting the level of deterrence.  Formally, if f < fM, then raise the fine to 
fM and lower the probability from p to (f/fM)p; the expected fine is still pf, so that deterrence is 
maintained, but expenditures on enforcement are reduced, implying that social welfare rises.  
Moreover, the optimal probability is such that there is some underdeterrence; in other words, at 
the optimal p, the expected fine pfM is less than the harm h.  The reason for this result is that if 
pfM equals h, behavior will be ideal, in which case decreasing p must be socially beneficial 
because the individuals thereby induced to commit the harmful act cause no net social losses 
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If individuals are risk averse, the optimal fine may well below the maximal fine, as 
stressed in Polinsky and Shavell (1979).  This is because the use of a very high fine would 
impose a substantial risk-bearing cost on individuals who commit harmful acts. 
Imprisonment.  Now suppose that the sanction is imprisonment and that individuals are 
risk neutral in imprisonment.  Then the optimal imprisonment term is maximal.  The reasoning is 
similar to that employed above with respect to fines: if the imprisonment term were not maximal, 
it could be raised and the probability of detection lowered so as to keep the expected prison term 
constant; neither individual behavior nor the costs of imposing imprisonment are affected 
(because the expected prison term is the same), but enforcement expenditures fall.  
If, instead, individuals are risk averse in imprisonment (the disutility of each additional 
year of imprisonment grows with the number of years in prison), there is a stronger argument for 
setting the imprisonment sanction maximally than when individuals are risk neutral.  Now, when 
the imprisonment term is raised, the probability of detection can be lowered even more than in 
the risk-neutral case without reducing deterrence.  Thus, not only are there greater savings in 
enforcement expenditures, but also the social costs of imposing imprisonment sanctions decline 
because the expected prison term falls.   
Last, suppose that individuals are risk preferring in imprisonment (the disutility of each 
additional year of imprisonment declines with the number of years in prison).  This possibility 
seems particularly important: the first years of imprisonment may create unusually high 
disutility, due to brutalization of the prisoner or due to the stigma of having been imprisoned at 
all.  In addition, individuals generally have positive time discount rates, which are thought to be 
especially significant for criminals.  In the case of risk-preferring individuals, the optimal prison 
term may well be less than maximal: if the sentence were raised, the probability that maintains 
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rise.  Thus, although there would be enforcement cost savings, they might not be great enough to 
offset the increased sanctioning costs. 
Fines versus imprisonment.  Fines generally are preferable to prison terms as a means of 
deterrence, since fines are socially cheaper sanctions to impose (Becker, 1968).  Hence, fines 
should be employed to the greatest extent possible — until a party’s wealth is exhausted —
 before imprisonment is imposed.  Further, imprisonment should be used as a sanction only if the 
harm prevented by the added deterrence is sufficiently great. 
Fault-based liability.  Our discussion so far has presumed that liability is strict, but 
liability may also be based on fault, an assessment of whether the act that caused harm was 
socially undesirable (analogous to the negligence rule and due care standard discussed above in 
the accident context).  Fault-based liability, like strict liability, can induce individuals to behave 
properly, but fault-based liability possesses an advantage when individuals are risk averse: if 
they act responsibly, they will not be found at fault, so will not bear the risk of being sanctioned. 
 Similarly, fault-based liability is advantageous when the form of the sanction is imprisonment, 
for then, again, individuals may be led to behave optimally without the actual imposition of 
sanctions, and thus without social costs being incurred (Shavell, 1987b).  To the extent that 
mistakes are made in determining fault, however, these two advantages are reduced because risk 
is imposed and sanctioning costs are incurred.  Note, too, that fault-based liability is more 
difficult to implement, because it requires the state to determine optimal behavior. 
Incapacitation.  Society may reduce harm not only through deterrence but also by 
imposing sanctions that remove parties from positions in which they are able to cause harm, that 
is, by incapacitating them.  Imprisonment is the primary incapacitative sanction, although there 
are other examples: individuals can lose their drivers’ licenses; businesses can lose their right to 
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Suppose that the sole function of imprisonment is to incapacitate.  Then it will be 
desirable to keep someone in jail as long as the reduction in crime from incapacitating him 
exceeds the costs of imprisonment (Shavell, 1987c).  Although this condition could hold for a 
long period, it is unlikely to, unless the harm prevented is very high, because the proclivity to 
commit crimes apparently declines sharply with age. 
Note that, as a matter of economic logic, the incapacitation rationale might imply that a 
person should be imprisoned even if he has not committed a crime — because the danger he 
poses to society makes incapacitating him worthwhile.  In practice, however, the fact that a 
person has committed a harmful act may be the best basis for predicting his future behavior, in 
which case the incapacitation rationale would suggest imprisoning an individual only if he has 
committed such an act. 
Two observations are worth noting about the relationship between optimal enforcement 
when incapacitation is the goal versus when deterrence is the goal.  First, when enforcement is 
based on incapacitation, the optimal magnitude of the sanction is independent of the probability 
of apprehension, which contrasts with the case when enforcement is based on deterrence.  
Second, when enforcement is deterrence-oriented, the probability and magnitude of sanctions 
depend on the ability to deter, and if this ability is limited (as, for instance, with the insane), a 
low expected sanction may be optimal, whereas a high sanction still might be called for to 
incapacitate.  
Other issues.  A number of other topics have been studied in the economic analysis of 
public law enforcement, including mistake, marginal deterrence (the effect of sanctions in 
reducing the severity of harm a party causes), self-reporting of violations (Kaplow and Shavell, 
1994a; Innes, 1999), repeat offenses, plea bargaining (Reinganum, 1988), general enforcement 
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(Mookherjee and Png, 1992; and Shavell, 1991), and corruption of law enforcement agents 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and Polinsky and Shavell, 2001).    
  Criminal law.  The subject of criminal law may be viewed in the light of the theory of 
public law enforcement (Posner, 1985; Shavell, 1985).  First, the fact that the acts in the core 
area of crime (robbery, murder, rape, and so forth) are punished by the sanction of imprisonment 
makes basic sense.  Were society to rely on fines alone, deterrence of the acts in question would 
be grossly inadequate.  Notably, the probability of detecting many of these acts is low, making 
the money sanction necessary for deterrence high, but the assets of individuals who commit these 
acts often are insubstantial.  Hence, the threat of prison is needed for deterrence.  Moreover, the 
incapacitative aspect of imprisonment is valuable because of the difficulty of deterring 
individuals who are prone to commit criminal acts. 
Second, many of the doctrines of criminal law appear to enhance social welfare.  This 
seems true of the basic feature of criminal law that punishment is not imposed on all harmful 
acts, but instead is usually confined to those that are undesirable.  (For example, murder is 
subject to criminal sanctions, but not all accidental killing.)  As we have stressed, when the 
socially costly sanction of imprisonment is employed, the fault system is desirable because it 
results in less frequent imposition of punishment than strict liability.  Also, the focus on intent in 
criminal law as a precondition for imposing sanctions may be sensible with regard to deterrence 
because those who intend to do harm are more likely to conceal their acts, and may be harder to 
discourage because of the benefits they anticipate.  That unsuccessful attempts to do harm are 
punished in criminal law is an implicit way of raising the likelihood of sanctions for undesirable 
acts.  Study of specific doctrines of criminal law seems to afford a rich opportunity for economic 
analysis.  
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6.  CRITICISM OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW.  Many observers, and 
particularly noneconomists, view economic analysis of law with skepticism.  We consider 
several such criticisms here. 
Description of behavior.  It is sometimes claimed that individuals and firms do not 
respond to legal rules as rational maximizers of their well-being.  For example, it is often 
asserted that decisions to commit crimes are not governed by economists’ usual assumptions.  
Some skeptics also suggest that, in predicting individuals’ behavior, certain standard 
assumptions are inapplicable.  For example, in predicting compliance with a law, the assumption 
that preferences be taken as given would be inappropriate if a legal rule would change people=s 
preferences, as some say was the case with civil rights laws and environmental laws.  In 
addition, laws may frame individuals’ understanding of problems, which could affect their 
probability assessments or willingness to pay.  The emerging field of behavioral economics, as 
well as work in various disciplines that address social norms, is beginning to examine these sorts 
of issues (Jolls et al., 1998). 
Distribution of income.  A frequent criticism of economic analysis of law concerns its 
focus on efficiency, to the exclusion of the distribution of income.  The claim of critics is that 
legal rules should be selected in a manner that takes into account their effects on the rich and the 
poor.  But achieving sought-after redistribution through income tax and transfer programs tends 
to be superior to redistribution through the choice of legal rules.  This is because redistribution 
through legal rules and the tax-transfer system both will distort individuals= labor-leisure 
decisions in the same manner, but redistribution through legal rules often will require choosing 
an inefficient rule, which imposes an additional cost (Shavell, 1981; Kaplow and Shavell, 
1994b).   
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rules: many individuals are never involved in litigation; and for those who are, there is 
substantial income heterogeneity among plaintiffs as well as among defendants.  Additionally, in 
contractual contexts, the choice of a legal rule often will not have any distributional effect 
because contract terms, notably, the price, will adjust so that any agreement into which parties 
enter will continue to reflect the initial distribution of bargaining power between them. 
Concerns for fairness.  An additional criticism is that the conventional economic 
approach slights important concerns about fairness, justice, and rights.  Some of these notions 
refer implicitly to the appropriateness of the distribution of income and, accordingly, are 
encompassed by our preceding remarks.  Also, to some degree, the notions are motivated by 
instrumental concerns.  For example, the attraction of paying fair compensation to victims must 
derive in part from the beneficial risk reduction effected by such payments, and the appeal of 
obeying contractual promises must rest in part on the desirable consequences contract 
performance has on production and exchange.  To some extent, therefore, critics’ concerns are 
already taken into account in standard economic analysis. 
However, many who promote fairness, justice, and rights do not regard these notions 
merely as some sort of proxy for attaining instrumental objectives.  Instead, they believe that 
satisfying these notions is intrinsically valuable.  This view also can be partially reconciled with 
the economic conception of social welfare: if individuals have a preference for a legal rule or 
institution because they regard it as fair, that should be credited in the determination of social 
welfare, just as any preference should. 
But many commentators take the position that conceptions of fairness are important as 
ethical principles in themselves, without regard to any possible relationship the principles may 
have to individuals’ welfare.  This opinion is the subject of longstanding debate among moral 
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individuals’ well-being because embracing such views entails a willingness to sacrifice 
individuals= well-being.  Indeed, consistently pursuing any non-welfarist principle must 
sometimes result in everyone being made worse off; see Kaplow and Shavell (2001, 2002). 
  Efficiency of judge-made law.  Also criticized is the contention of some economically-
oriented legal academics, notably Posner (1972), that judge-made law tends to be efficient (in 
contrast to legislation, which is said to reflect the influence of special interest groups).  Some 
critics believe that judge-made law is guided by notions of fairness, or is influenced by legal 
culture or judges’ biases, and thus will not necessarily be efficient.  Whatever is the merit of the 
critics’ claims, they are descriptive assertions about the law, and their validity does not bear on 
the power of economics to predict behavior in response to legal rules or on the value of 
normative economic analysis of law. 
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